- Introduction
- The Philosophy of Integrated Care
- The Inherent Conflicts of Social Reconstruction
- Balancing the Values of Commerce and Altruism
- The Need for an Ethical Framework for Government Decision Making
- The Role of Ethics in Addressing the Challenges
- Conclusions
- Notes
Introduction
For the past two hundred years and more, clinicians have generally accepted that their behaviour has and should conform to what has been termed a code of ethics. This has been a comfortable perception and any challenge to its supposedly altruistic basis has raised the expected extreme defensive reaction which greets critics of any fundamentalist ideology. 1 The analogy can be taken further, many who base their behaviour according to fundamentalist beliefs are good citizens as judged by any standards, they genuinely help others and inflict the minimum of harm upon citizens generally. But unfortunately, within the ranks of fundamentalist believers, and within most self regulated professions, lie small minorities of the self-righteous, the exploiters of fellow citizens, and some very insensitive people, who adopt a whole range of techniques from indifference, through denial, to frank deceit to ensure their non-participation in difficult across-community debates concerning justice, equity and similar imponderables.
These opening statements are somewhat pompous and difficult to encapsulate concisely. Unfortunately, they are highly relevant to all the problems raised within the debates concerning health maintenance and promotion versus expenditure on disease and accidents. The spectre of rationing throws into relief different perspectives within society and within professions. If this fact of human nature is not recognised, there is little point in talking about integration of care systems. Ethical considerations will have no influence upon political and economic decisions unless the environment in which they will be applied has itself been analysed.
Given the widely differing perspectives on what is to be considered acceptable versus unacceptable behaviour, laudable achievement versus reprehensible exploitation, entitlement versus responsibility and acceptance, individual nations have to decide somehow or other to what extent they will take the debate seriously rather than muddle along until some huge crisis demands immediate action. Some argue that the crisis is with us; others, as always, insist that the ultimate problem concerns the establishment of consensus. 1
The New Zealand Health Funding Authority (HFA) has set out objectives which hopefully might guide development of integration in this country.
The HFA aims to “ensure that the best value mix of health and disability support services are used to meet consumers’ needs and address fragmentation problemsâ€. Two key aspects of this are:
- purchase of services on an outcome basis rather than as many separate components;
- increase in provider responsiveness to consumers, eg by providing consumers with the ability to exercise choice.
The HFA Board also wishes to ensure that any policies adopted ensure that the risks of increased demand and the possible benefits from reduced utilisation or changes in service mix are managed appropriately.
Such lofty announcements are commonplace in policy documents world-wide. They imply an ethical content. An ethical framework may not necessarily be based on traditional medical professional ethics. Many critics of the health professionals perceive the traditional codes to be little more than codified systems for maintaining professional status and power. Conversely, business ethics, as understood vaguely within the community generally, matches badly with such principles as those which underlie the patient’s bill of rights, or which are based on the needs of the patient or client being paramount. 2
Given then, that perceptions of ethical standards vary widely within the groupings which must contribute to the current debates on rationing and integrated care, it is not surprising that there is little agreement concerning key definitions in other areas of debate. There is no commonly agreed definition for the term “integrated careâ€, and certainly widely different views about its meaning are held within New Zealand. 3
The Philosophy of Integrated Care
For the purposes of this article the definition used is one which is likely to be adopted by the Executive of the New Zealand Medical Association:
“Integrated care is an approach whereby health services for a defined population are financed and delivered through an integrated system to ensure access, equity and quality of care in a cost effective way, which is modified by patients, professional and community values, including acceptance by all parties of limited resources.â€
That definition incorporates most generally accepted features of integrated care and can be interpreted as complying with the considerations of the HFA Board. Like the HFA Board statements, the above definition does not define (nor can it) what quantum of resources is being inferred, or what system of allocation. Undoubtedly, those charged with the task of developing the integrated care concept will seek guidance, but they are likely to face a daunting situation. It is to be hoped that they will not become cynical and seek the fundamentalist escape from the difficulties through blind adherence to a particular economic–political ideology. The history of the 1991-93 health reforms in New Zealand, of the Core Health Services Committee, and of the Public Health Commission, provide clear sign posts concerning both the hazards and at least some of the patterns of solution which are fallacious. The current restructuring of New Zealand society is based on a particular political–economic hypothesis, and not upon an historically proven formula of achievement for solving various sets of social problems.
Essentially, the concept of integrated care, as expressed in all the somewhat vague definitions produced to date, needs to address a resource allocation problem which is perceived as becoming progressively more acute and politically destabilising. Put another way, the belief is widespread that health care spending is rising too rapidly for the private and public resource to meet demand and more particularly to ensure equity of access. The changing structure of the population, the potential introduction of new and expensive technologies, the expectations of what universal health insurance can offer, and the relative slowing of economic growth are perceived to be the culprits. Cabinets have been slow to accept, let alone acknowledge, that they cannot meet the growing expectations of individual citizens through taxation, 4 but individual citizens have had their expectations heightened through the ineptitude of the politicians, and through the self-promotional exercises of the medical-technology industry and the health professions generally. Within New Zealand that issue is further complicated by debates concerning the extent to which the individual citizens should contribute, as opposed to the general resource allocation through taxation. Obviously, ethical considerations must influence the outcome of the various sub-debates. Integrated care involves the concept of a shared responsibility between private and public resources. In ethical terms, however the nature of the relationship between patient and health professional differs between these two health sectors.
Within the private system, both traditionally and today, the contract is directly between the patient and family and the health provider. The third-party influence in the private sector is becoming more intrusive but remains less so than within the public system. In the public system, the relationship between the receiver and the provider is blurred in an individual sense. A patient undergoing surgery in a public hospital does not have direct choice of the surgeon and anaesthetist. The ethical considerations are not quite the same. In the public system, the requirements of the individual must be fitted into the total operation in a manner which, even now, does not dominate the private sector. However, particularly for older people, that distinction between private and public is becoming steadily more hazy as third-party influences become dominant. The concept of integrated care will blur that ethical distinction even more.
The problems and readjustments will not be limited primarily to the patient and family. Health professionals generally are being confronted at an increasingly alarming rate with situations that have a series of implications all of which have major ethical aspects. Private practice is becoming less private. Traditional concepts of professional freedom are becoming increasingly illusory within the public system. Perspectives on information, its collection, collation, analysis and the validity of consequential actions, vary across the professions and amongst the players in our health services. 5
Before proceeding to analyse these changes further, some further general points must be outlined.
As indicated in the preamble to this paper, the problems concerning integrated care are being defined by people who cannot be expected to share common perspectives. In a thoughtful chapter entitled, “How much should we spend on health services?â€, Professor Jeffrey Richardson from the Department of Economics, Monash University quotes the results of an Australian study surveying population perspectives contrasting maximum of quality life years versus equity of access to health care. 6 “The 551 survey respondents rejected the principle that, all else being equal, the least costly option should be adopted because this would permit more patients to be treated.†The same study also revealed that “a smaller number of health years may be preferred when they are shared amongst a larger number of recipientsâ€. The important point made by Richardson is that “it is not known exactly what ethical principles people wish to incorporate in the overall health sector and what price they are prepared to pay for these principles.â€
Studies such as those quoted by Richardson draw attention to the gross lack of information concerning individual versus collective attitudes as to what should be the ethical drivers determining health service structure and financing. Methodology in this area remains primitive, thus allowing wild statements to be made by people supporting particular ideologies or economic theories, whose views cannot be substantiated or rejected in the absence of sound evidence. We continue to have major problems defining the value of health services and the value of health outcomes in terms of individual viewpoints on the one hand and across society perspectives on the other. The sets of values do not appear to mesh. In this sense the lack of congruence in outlook mirrors that of the health professional, in terms of responsibility to the individual patient versus responsibility to the insurance company or State. Changes in outlook must occur across the health professions and the whole community coincidentally with any new pattern of rationing – reform and rationing are inseparable. 7
The notion of integrated care is, thus, being introduced at a time when essential information is lacking and when methods available to explore the consequences of particular sets of action are inadequate. This does not bode well when it comes to making key decisions. If the benefits are unknown or it is unclear how to measure them, or how they are valued by individual people, what basis is there for proceeding with the development of integrated care?
In keeping with Richardson, the way ahead must lie in addressing the power imbalance in the system. The traditional system in New Zealand has involved a medical profession which requested and received resources from the community, essentially via the taxation system. Under that system, the primary duty of a medical practitioner was to the individual patient. In addition, and to varying degrees, some practitioners accepted that they had the added responsibility of considering opportunity costs. The very nature of the consumer society, the not-so-hidden power of media persuasion, and of the media-feeding industrial process, must somehow be circumvented in terms of the decision making processes.
The Inherent Conflicts of Social Reconstruction
It is obvious that the ethical considerations of these groupings, from their perspectives, must conflict with those which determine overall resource allocation to health services. The HFA and PHARMAC, despite strident statements to the contrary, represent New Zealand’s current, and initial attempts to establish agency arrangements which can moderate the effects of power imbalance. Genuine market conditions have never applied, and never will to the health sector, and the current ideology underlying much of social reconstruction within New Zealand is inappropriate. In this situation, New Zealand has gone down the pathway of the purchaser–provider split, and the HFA envisages a fair, transparent and uniform contracting system as the appropriate pathway to follow. This obviously has implications for the pattern of integrated care development. The alternative pathway of so-called managed competition would satisfy one arm of the current ideology but conflict with the other, ie the call for deregulation.
In a managed competition environment, equity is achieved through regulation of the risk-related subsidies, an inevitable accompaniment. However, as Richardson points out, managed care of the type originally proposed in North America might be the most effective system for achieving the desired allocation efficiency. “With either option the era of professional dominance and passive government/private insurance would come to an end.â€
All that discussion, begs the question concerning the quantum of resource. Once again, core values of beliefs of individuals, versus citizenry generally, should determine the setting of balances via the ballot-box. Recent history suggests that this does not happen. Cabinet certainly considers, and takes risks concerning, opportunity costs before it allocates the budget. Recent history suggests that the Government perspective on opportunity costs does not tally with that of the electorate generally. The Government obviously has reservations concerning the overall benefits which accrue from increasing health expenditure. The citizens of the smaller rural towns of New Zealand do not see things that way.
Thus, it is again the issue of which individual’s or groups’ sets of values should determine which decisions are taken. The people taking those decisions do not necessarily do so on the basis of the ethical principles to which other sections of the community claim allegiance. It is not difficult to make the case that an Old Testament-type fundamentalist attitude has driven some of the key people behind the health reforms in New Zealand. “He who is not for us is against us.†Because the health professions could not be trusted to align enthusiastically behind the reforms, they were not to be trusted. The ultimate consequences of this fundamentalist approach taken, in an absence of any overt covering ethical “social†umbrella, reached their peak in the circumstances leading to the investigation of Canterbury Health in 1998.
Thus, it is in some ways an absence of ethical considerations that may yet determine at least the initial framework of integrated care. Evidence in favour of that viewpoint comes from the manner in which the odometer-fraud situation has been handled by Government. In that situation, what most health professionals would regard as fairly loose ethical guidelines have been turned on their head to produce a pragmatic solution for a fiscally daunting problem.
Balancing the Values of Commerce and Altruism
One viewpoint attracting world-wide attention is that, at least initially, traditional health professional ethical principles will be consciously or unconsciously discarded in the general panic surrounding the political and economic issues progressively plaguing health services. A very thoughtful editorial has been published by Gillon in the Journal of Medical Ethics. 8 He reviews succinctly situations discussed at length by Elliot Freidson. 9 These writers point out that commercial approaches to problems of the health services undermine social solidarity both within the professions and the community generally. Traditional concepts of altruism are regarded with intense suspicion. Gillon is even-handed in his comments. He draws attention to the basic fact that most people are altruistic in part only! He indicates that the balance has yet to be set appropriately in health services between commerce and altruistic contributions by people across the total community. The importance of his arguments lies in the implication that there is need and scope for re-visiting the ethical and value systems which can be identified as common to most sections of the community. The corollary is that no particular section, eg the medical profession, can be held to have total omniscience in these matters.
These thoughts are taken further by the Right Honourable Lady Warnock. 10 A summary of a lecture she gave at University Hospital, Lewisham, has been published under the title, “Ethics, ideology and rationing in the NHSâ€. She traces the history of socialised medicine from its conception as one aspect of moral duty by society through to the present day. She points out that the original concept was, “that nobody had to make private contractual arrangementsâ€. The state had a duty to meet the needs of the people. Added to this concept was an apparent willingness to pay high taxes, and that included high employees’ contributions. She proceeds to trace the evolution of the problems brought about by expectations which, progressively, could no longer be met. Concepts of entitlement turned to demands. Politicians gradually, with diffidence, faced up to the inevitability of rationing in both public and private services, but the public was ill prepared to face reality. The media have not made things easier while stressing, and often distorting, the poignant realities which health professionals now face in being unable to do all that is possible for everyone. It is at this point, that the necessity for pragmatism on the part of, eg a doctor, inevitably clashes with beliefs and values systems of independent people, of groups, and of philosophers and ethicists. To quote Lady Warnock, “If limited resources, they would say, can be invoked to justify the withdrawal of treatment in this case, where will it end? Will it end with the killing of all disabled people, on the grounds that their treatment constitutes a waste of money?â€
In thus introducing the slippery slope argument into her lecture, Lady Warnock indicated that it should be taken seriously, “only because it is so commonly invokedâ€. The answer is that a particular instance, eg allowing a grossly deformed unconscious baby to die, does not lead in the direction of killing all disabled people. A particular incident leads to a particular outcome and the doctor is only one of the parties involved. “If he (the doctor) could save the baby with a prospect of having a reasonable life ahead of him he would; and secondly, he can do nothing without the agreement of the parents. In this sort of case parental consent, combined with professional commitment of the doctor to a patient who is of reasonable hope, must together constitute the block on the slippery slope. Similarly, the decision to stop treating a patient with irreversible coma can hardly be depicted as the road to a widespread, cost-saving euthanasia.†Fortunately, clinicians do not share the luxury enjoyed by some philosophers and ethicists. Doctors cannot reduce consideration of human action and reaction to averages or predictable certainties.
These considerations are not tangential to the issues raised concerning ethics within integrated care systems. In keeping with Dr Warnock’s view, there is reason to have faith in the body of health practitioners and in their capacity to accept responsibility with a coherence that is not present in other sections of society. However, there is less reason to be confident in the immediate prospects for cohesion in terms of ethical principles to be manifest effectively across the community.
To quote Dr Warnock again, “Although we are all selfish when we, or more especially our families, are ill, we may have to learn to temper our selfishness by some thought for the society of which we are a partâ€. That in itself would not be a problem, were not some people more selfish than others. The law pays lip service to quality but even within the legal system such a quality does not prevail across the citizenry. Friedmanite economics translates this principle of equality to the concept of user pays in an environment in which choice is regarded as a given. Successive New Zealand governments, which have introduced monetarist concepts into the New Zealand economy, and exalted the user-pays principle have no hesitation in flaunting this, when it, the Government, introduces some new commitment to a health service but fails to provide the additional resource. Opportunity costs being what they are, the user, ie the patient, pays in a manner that is contrary to the expressed views of the Government. These paradoxes abound and point once again to the absence of an ethical framework underlying key governmental decisions.
The Need for an Ethical Framework for Government Decision Making
Obviously, those who make key decisions at Cabinet or major agency levels are not lacking in principles. Politicians particularly are the ultimate exponents of compromise and pragmatism. Unfortunately, they tend to favour simplistic solutions and uniform application of policies and measures. They thus avoid the need for themselves to make certain value judgements. The past ten years of health reform in New Zealand again testify to this capacity of the individuals in the political system for avoiding identification of core values or beliefs. Health professionals do not have that luxury.
Meanwhile, pressures are mounting. What could be interpreted as a new wave of anti-altruism has gripped the medical technology industry and the ageing population in the USA. In a recent issue of the Washington Post, Justin Gillis painted a disturbing picture and the article was republished in the Guardian Weekly. 11 To Mr Gillis, Prozac is the archetype and Viagra the next stage in a new tidal wave: “if there are no limits, are Americans prepared to see the cost of health care start rising again, undermining economic growth and hurting people who aren’t wealthy?â€. He quotes a benefits analyst, Helen Darling: “These new treatments, repairing damage done over a lifetime, will force a new public debate about what costs should be borne by everyone through socialised dollars. I believe the big crunch is still ahead of us.â€
Such then is the background, and the probable future reality, within which health professionals and governments are groping towards some new system of organisation, driven by fiscal anxiety. It seems axiomatic that western governments do not wish to lead the debate. 4 In the absence of governmental leadership, managed care has developed as a series of experiments in the United States, and many of the initiatives are now discredited. Managed care seeks to modify the practices of doctors through use of clinical guidelines, financial incentives, imposition of preferred provider networks and various combinations of these techniques. Unfortunately, health professionals’ distinct lack of altruism and skewed perceptions of their own entitlements, combined with a misunderstanding of what clinical freedom is all about, has poisoned the well. The experiment has not ended, and New Zealand would be unwise to adopt without careful consideration any of the North American patterns which have so far emerged. 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 Recent experience in Australia reinforces the warning, that major moves into the private insurance markets are likely to intensify feelings of dissatisfaction amongst health professionals and of betrayal amongst patients. A majority of New Zealand doctors would not accept the statement, that across the total population of the UK as compared with the USA, the NHS delivers a higher, more uniform quality of care at acceptable cost than does the pluralistic US system.
Until comparisons between schemes and systems are made dispassionately in an absence of blinkered ideological fundamentalism, little progress will be made. Until such dispassionate analysis is financed adequately by central government and includes all the players, on an equal footing, core values and beliefs will not be identified. Within New Zealand the debate continues to be unorganised and confusion is increasing. This is not a satisfactory environment for the introduction of integrated care let alone for definition thereof.
The Role of Ethics in Addressing the Challenges
There is a role for ethics in this messy situation. The medical profession’s traditional ethical principles could form the starting point for discussions relating policy determination decision taking and ethics. Unfortunately, not all doctors apparently accept that statement, having already been successfully wooed by the attractions of a relatively unbridled commercial market.
The specific ethical challenges are reasonably clear cut. It is not difficult to find examples in the North American experiment of under-servicing and of cost-shifting. Some aspects of the health service changes in New Zealand are really blatant cost-shifting exercises. There are ethical issues concerning traditional medical concepts of “ownership†of patients and families as opposed to the partnership doctor–patient relationship which is fundamental to traditional ethics. Certainly the power balances of possession-of-information and equality in decision taking have changed and will continue to do so in an accelerating fashion. The change may not have progressed far enough, however, for easy transition to integrated care.
A specific issue, which appears to be purely fiscal, but which has its roots deeply in ethics, concerns disposition of time and who pays for such temporal allocation. New Zealand has a primary care system based on fee-for-service and a state-funded secondary tier which is bulk-funded. Capitation is seen as the way round these two contrasting fiscal arrangements. The introduction of capitation raises the strong possibility that an extra burden could be shifted onto secondary (state funded) services.
Considerable readjustments will be required in primary care under a capitation scheme, and the associated ethical considerations relate to the disposition of time given to counselling, preventative medicine and similar activities versus diagnosis, treatment and referral. 16 , 17
Inevitably there will be conflicts of interest, given the information imbalance, and the different perspectives based on the experience and life circumstances of doctor versus those of patient and family. There is, however, no conflict with traditional medical ethical principles. It will still be possible to attempt the maximum for a particular patient and to induce minimal harm, in the context of the total resource available, provided all transactions are open and adequate time is spent in explaining the exact circumstances and the basis for decisions suggested by the doctor. What will change is not so much the overt statements concerning medical ethics, but rather the stance of doctors. Rather than avoiding involvement in the political system they must become active participants on behalf of their patients.
Good doctoring in ethical terms will require doctors to demonstrate that provision of the maximum possible and maximal avoidance of harm is based upon their knowledge and involvement of all the factors underlying natural justice and of the factors which limit autonomy of both patient and practitioner. Doctor–patient discussions in future must include disclosure of financial restraints and key contractual elements when obtaining of informed consent is the central issue. 18
Conclusions
There is no need to modify the current basic four principles. Thus, ethical guidelines fundamental to the introduction of what is likely to be the pattern of integrated care, as set out in the definition quoted above, should not differ from those established upon the basis of several hundred years’ experience and enunciated during the last 50 to 100 years.
This viewpoint, however, incorporates no guarantee that there will be an ethical framework underlying new approaches to health care delivery in New Zealand. As already outlined, there are ominous warnings inherent in governmental action, and to some extent in individual health practitioner reaction, when one considers events over the past 10 to 15 years. There seems to be an absence of an overriding philosophy to which fiscal reforms are the handmaiden. Rather, a particular fiscal framework based on a particular economic theory is determining the decisions which are restructuring New Zealand society. Thus the social consequences can be envisaged as a fall-out, rather than a result of, a vision for the future based on the concept that social policy determines the means whereby particular objectives are achieved. If that is indeed the approach, there are few safeguards in the present system, and the societal structures which might preserve or strengthen them are being steadily eroded. Responsible health professionals, like citizens generally, should be concerned. Fortunately New Zealand remains a democracy, with a free press despite all the inroads of globalisation. As a country, New Zealand has a proud record of social policy development. Just as the medical profession needs to return to its ethical roots, so New Zealand generally needs to relate its future development to its proud past traditions of social experimentation based on concepts of equity and dignity.
Clarion calls to confront the issue of rationing are not new. 19 Doctors are long accustomed to administering clandestine forms of rationing within their own practices, but they have undertaken this paternalistic process as one expression of their own autonomy. Many doctors are still reluctant to explore this feature of traditional practice in open, across-community debate. As they seek to claim their rightful autonomy in terms of decisions relating to themselves, patients will come to realise progressively that informed choice is not a simple matter. As technology advances, uncertainty of outcome for the individual rather than enhanced precision of prediction will increase. 20 To be meaningful, the doctor–patient partnership must involve new relationships, bilateral concessions and re-establishment of mutual trust.
Elliot Freidson concluded the final chapter of his book Profession of Medicine with this paragraph:
"Medical practitioners are at a critical point in their history: the decisions they make now will have a lasting effect on the quality of the reorganised health system that is just beginning to emerge. In responding to the economic, administrative and technical pressures that are now transforming the content, terms and conditions of their work, they would do well to show how the fate of patients is tied to the fate of their doctors. If they merely parrot the worn rhetoric of good intentions while transparently advancing their own selfish interests, they will continue to lose their influence on policy. But if they struggle for policies sustaining the kind of responsible and limited autonomy that is patently justified by the welfare of patients, medical practitioners will find many allies to help them preserve what is best in the traditions of their profession."
I am most grateful to Laura Wragg for secretarial assistance in preparation of this paper.
Notes
- Benatar SR. Millenial challenges for medicine & modernity. J R Coll Physicians Lond 1998; 32:160–65.
- Mariner WK. Business vs medical ethics: conflicting standards for managed care. Am J Law Med 1995; 23:236–46.
- McCormick R, Rainger W. Integrated care. Health Manager 1997; 4:7–10.
- Smith R. Rationing health care: moving the debate inward. BMJ, 1996; 312:1553–54.
- Stevens R. Medical record databases – just what you need? Report prepared for the Privacy Commissioner. New Zealand; 1998.
- Richardson J. In: Baume P, editor. The tasks of medicine – an ideology of care (Chapter 17). Sydney: Maclennan & Petty, 1998. p250–76.
- Callahan D. Symbols, rationality and justice: rationing health care. Am J Law Med 1992; 28:1–13.
- Gillon R. Commerce & medical ethics. J Med Ethics 1997; 23:67–68.
- Freidson E. Profession of medicine. A study of the sociology of applied knowledge. "Afterword". Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988. p383–92 (391–392).
- Warnock H M. Ethics, ideology & rationing in the NHS. J R Coll Physicians Lond 1998; 32:118–120.
- Gillis J. Prescription for a better life. Guardian Weekly 17 May 1998.
- Silvestri F. Looking past managed care towards local service integration. Health Manager 1997; 4:3–6.
- Wynne JM. Australia warns about US health corporations. NZ Med Ass Newsletter 25 July 1997; 176:5,7.
- Wiles A. Capitation; the HFA vision for general practice. NZ Med Ass Newsletter 22 May 1998; 194:1–2,6,7.
- Christensen KT. Ethically important distinctions among managed care organisations. Am J Law Med 1995; 23:223–29.
- Malinowski MJ. Capitation; advances in medical technology and the advent of a new era in medical ethics. Am J Law Med 1996; 22:331–60.
- Miller FM. Foreword: the promise & problems of capitation. Am J Law Med, 1996; 22:167–72.
- Miller FM. Denial of health care and informed consent in English and American law. Am J Law Med 1992; 18:37–71.
- Klein R. Dimensions of rationing – who should do what? BMJ 1993; 307:309–12.
- Logan RL, Scott PJ. Uncertainty in clinical practice: implications for quality and costs of health care. Lancet 1996; 347:595–98.









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